Hans Reichenbach’s Scientific Philosophy: An Evaluation In Terms of Context of Discovery And Verification

The contexts of discovery and verification established two important stages of the scientific method. Putting forward a new hypothesis is associated with the context of discovery and the act of discovery has been included in the research field of psychology with its irrational characterization as it involves a creative intuition. The testing of the hypothesis fell within the scope of the verification context and was considered as the subject of epistemology or logic, as it was thought to indicate a completely rational process. This distinction, which is generally accepted to be made by Hans Reichenbach, who accused traditional philosophy of being speculative and tended to scientification philosophy, fulfilled an important task in determining scientificity and it has a remarkable position in the positivist scientific tradition. In this article, it will be tried to explain how Reichenbach grounded his scientific philosophy by examining what kind of distinction he makes between the contexts of discovery and verification. The aim of this article is to remind the views of the philosopher, especially in his works Experience and Prediction and The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, to analyze the content of the distinction between the contexts of discovery and verification in terms of the contributions of both those who discuss the issue in a similar way and those who approach the issue critically.