Manifoldness as a Veiled Notion of Critique of Pure Reason: A Clue for Understanding the Transcendental Deductions

The transcendental deduction of the pure concepts or functions of the understanding is the heart of Kant s Critique of Pure Reason. According to Kant, a conclusive determination of the boundaries of cognitive powers of the mind (Gemüth) essentially rests on this kind of special investigation. What is more, he confidently asserts that transcendental deduction has an inescapable and indispensable aspect for the constitution of metaphysics as an exact science. As it is well-known, the first edition of the Critique published in 1781. Following this publication, in his 1786 dated work Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant mentions some serious problems about the formulation of deduction. After a while later, at the second edition of the Critique published in 1787, he completely rewrites the cornerstone chapter of the text. As a result of this alteration, a major disagreement arises among commentators of Kant. In this study, focusing on the manifoldness which is a veiled notion of the Critique, we will try to offer a preparatory discussion for a better understanding of the two different versions of transcendental deductions.