Ludwig wittgenstein’s criticism of science of ethics

The discussion over the possibility of science of ethics stands for one of the significant parts of philosophy of ethics. Ludwig Wittgenstein does not seem to be dealing with these issues, however he has various vital reasoning that contribute to this discussion. His objections to the idea of science of ethics can be expressed generally under two titles: an ultimate scientific justification and a method established over this justification. In his view, ethics refers to an area in which one is active as the doer. This area demands for a special logic and it cannot be grounded with an approach that does not provide this demand. One of the frames that will not meet this demand is scientific logic. Ethics cannot be justified scientifically, and so it also cannot be founded as a scientific theory of ethics. Actually this would mean that ethics reach an ultimate determination and Wittgenstein states it is against the nature of what he understands from ethics. In addition, that ethics cannot be justified scientifically does not necessarily mean that ethics can be handled with a relativist approach. The former does not mean that ethics does not have a justification, but it will mean that it has a sui generis one.